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THE FUZZY VAULT FOR FINGERPRINTS IS VULNERABLE TO
BRUTE FORCE ATTACK
PREDA MIHA˘ILESCU
Abstract. The fuzzy vault approach is one of the best studied and well ac-
cepted ideas for binding cryptographic security into biometric authentication.
We present in this paper a brute force attack which improves upon the one
described by Clancy et. al. [CKL] in an implementation of the vault for
fingerprints. On base of this attack, we show that three implementations of
the fingerprint vault are vulnerable and show that the vulnerability cannot be
avoided by mere parameter selection in the actual frame of the procedure.
We also give several suggestions which can improve the fingerprint vault
to a cryptographically secure algorithm. In particular, we introduce the idea
of fuzzy vault with quiz which draws upon information resources unused by
the current version of the vault. This is work in progress, bringing impor-
tant security improvements and which can be adapted to the other biometric
applications of the vault.
1. Introduction
Secure communication relays on trustable authentication. The most wide spread
authentication methods still use passwords and pass-phrases as a first step towards
identity proving. Secure pass-phrases are hard to remember, and the modern user
needs a large amount of dynamic passwords for her security. This limitation has
been known for a long time and it can in part be compensated by the use of chip
cards as universal access tokens.
Biometrical identification, on the other hand, is based on the physical identity
of a person, rather than on the control of a token. Reliable biometric authenti-
cation would thus put an end to password insecurity, various repudiation disputes
and many more short comings of phrase or token based identities. Unlike the de-
terministic keys which are common for cryptography, the biometric data are only
reproducible within vaguely controlled error bounds, they are prone to various
physical distortions and have quite low entropy.
Overcoming the disadvantages of the two worlds by using their reciprocal ad-
vantages is an important concern. Unsurprisingly, we look back to almost a decade
in which the biometrics community developed an increasing interest in the security
and privacy of biometrical systems. We refer to the survey [UPPJ] of Uludag et.
al. on biometric cryptosystems for an update overview of the work in this area.
Researchers from cryptography and coding theory, attempted to develop new
concepts allowing to model and evaluate biometric data from an information theo-
retical point of view. The resulting algorithms deal with the specific restraints of
biometrics: non - uniformly distributed data with incomplete reproducibility and
low, hard to estimate, entropy. Both communities are motivated by the wish to
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handle biometrics like a classical password, thus protecting it by some variant of
one-time functions and performing the verification in the image space. Unlike pass-
words, the biometrics are not deterministic. This generates substantial challenges
for the verification after one - time function transforms. Furthermore, disclosure of
biometric templates is considered to be a more vital loss then the loss of a password.
Juels and Wattenberg [JW] and then Juels and Sudan [JS] have developed with
the fuzzy commitments and fuzzy vault two related approaches with a strong im-
pact in biometric security. The papers of Dodis et. al. [DORS, BDKOS] can be
consulted for further theoretic development of the concepts of Juels et. al. and
their formalization in an information theoretic frame. It is inherent to the problem,
that core concepts of the theory, such as the entropy of a biometric template, are
hard to even estimate. Thus the security proofs provided by the theory do not
translate directly in practical estimates or indications. As a consequence, we shall
see that concrete implementation studies of the fuzzy vault have to be considered
for security investigations, whilst the original paper [JS] does not contain sufficient
directions of application in order to allow such an analysis. Since we focus on the
application of the vault to the biometry of fingerprints, we shall often use the term
of fingerprint vault for this case.
Clancy, Kiyavash and Lin gave in 2003 [CKL] a statistically supported analysis
for a realistic implementation of the vault to fingerprints. The authors observe from
the start that the possible parameter choices in this context are quite narrow for
allowing sufficient security; they succeed to define a set of parameters which they
claim to provide the cryptographically acceptable security of O(269) operations for
an attack. We show that faster attacks are possible in the given frame, thus making
brute force possible. The analysis in [CKL] are outstanding and have been used
directly or indirectly in subsequent papers; the good security was obtained at the
price of a quite high error probability (20%− 30%).
Uludag and Jain provided in [UJ1, UJ2] an implementation of the fuzzy vault for
fingerprints which uses alignment help - data and was applied to the fingerprints
from the database [FVC]. This improves the identification rate; however some of the
simplifications they make with respect to [CKL] reduce security quite dramatically.
The ideas of these authors could however very well be combined with the more
defensive security approach of Clancy et. al.
Yang and Verbauwhede [YV] describe an implementation of the vault, with no
alignment help, which follows closely the concepts of [CKL] and focuses upon adapt-
ing to various template qualities and the number of minutiae recognized in these
templates.
We describe the original fuzzy vault in Section 2 and argue that the security
proofs and remarks given in [JS] are insufficient for fingerprint applications. In the
same section we describe and prove our approach to brute force attack. In Section 3
we discuss the various implementations mentioned above and show that brute force
can be performed in feasible time in all instances. In Section 4 we discuss possible
variants and alternatives and suggest the use of additional sources of information,
thus raising the security vault to acceptable cryptographic standards.
2. The Fuzzy Vault
The fuzzy vault is an algorithm for hiding a secret string S in such a way that
a user who is in possession of some additional information T can easily recover
S, while an intruder should face computationally infeasible problems in order to
achieve this goal. The information T can be fuzzy, in the sense that the secret S is
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locked by some related, but not identical data T ′. Juels and Sudan define the vault
in general terms, allowing multiple applications. Biometry is one of them and we
shall restrict our description directly to the setting of fingerprints. Generalizations
are obvious, or can be found in [JS, DORS, BDKOS].
The string is prepared for the transmission in the vault as follows. Let S ∈
{0, 1}∗ be a secret string of l bits length. The user (Alice, say) that wishes to be
identified by the string S has her finger scanned and a locking set L comprising
the Cartesian coordinates of t minutiae in the finger scan is selected from this
finger template T ′; the couples of coordinates are concatenated to single numbers
Xi = (xi||yi) ∈ L. One selects a finite field Fq attached to the vault and lets
k′ + 1 = ⌈ llog
2
(q) ⌉ be the number of elements in Fq necessary to encode S. One
assumes that 0 < maxX∈LX < q and maps X →֒ Fq by some convention. Selecting
f(X) ∈ Fq[X ] to be a polynomial of degree k−1 > k
′ with coefficients which encode
S in some predetermined way, one builds the genuine set:
G = G(Fq, S, t, k,L) = {(Xi, Yi) : Xi ∈ L;Yi = f(Xi)} ,
which encodes the information of S. The genuine verifier Bob has an original
template T of Alice’s finger and should use this information in order to recover
f(X) and then S. In order to make an intruder’s (Victor, say) attempt to recover
S computationally hard, the genuine set is mixed with a large set of chaff points
C = { (Uj ,Wj) : j = 1, 2, . . . , r − t},
with Uj 6∈ L and Wj 6= f(Uj); the chaff points should be random uniformly dis-
tributed. Chaff points and genuine lists are shuffled to a common vault with pa-
rameters:
V = V(k, t, r,Fq) = G ∪ C.
Upon reception, Bob will generate an unlocking set U . This set contains those
Xi coordinates of vault points, which well approximate coordinates of minutiae in
T . Note that in order to have a reasonable approximation of minutiae coordinates
of the same finger in different templates, this templates must
a) Have negligeable non linear distortions.
b) Be aligned modulo affine transforms.
The second condition is addressed in [UJ2]. The unlocking set may be erronated,
thus either allowing some chaff points which are closer to T ′ then locking points,
or making the choice of a sufficiently large unlocking set hard. Both problems can
be addressed within given limits by error correcting codes. Thus Juels and Sudan
suggest using Reed Solomon codes for decoding f(X).
The security argumentation in [JS] is based upon the expectation that the chaff
points will build an important amount of subsets of t elements, whose coordinates
are interpolated by polynomials g(X) ∈ Fq[X ] of degree k, thus hiding the correct
value of f(X) from Victor among the set of polynomials g(X). The argument is
backed up by the following Lemma, a proof of which can be found in [JS, CKL].
Lemma 1. For every µ, 0 < µ < 1 and every vault V(k, t, r,Fq), there are at least
µ
3 · q
k−t · (r/t)t random polynomials g(X) ∈ Fq[X ] such that V contains t couples
(Uj , g(Uj)).
2.1. A brute force attack. If Victor intercepts a vault V = V(k, t, r,Fq), but has
no additional information about the location of minutiae or some of their statistics,
he may still try to recover S by brute force trials. For this he needs to find k points
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in the genuine list G. The chances that k points of the vault are also in the genuine
list are:
1/P =
(
r
k
)
(
t
k
) ∼ (r/t)k < 1.1 · (r/t)k, for r > t > 5.(1)
This, together with the fact that the probability that a random pair (X,Y ) ∈ F2q lays
on the graph of a given polynomial f(X) ∈ Fq[X ] is equal to P [Y = f(X)] = 1/q,
yield the ground for the proof of Lemma 1.
Lagrange interpolation of a polynomial of degree k can be done in O(k log2(k))
operations [GG]; checking whether an additional point (U,W ) lays on the graph of
f(X) (so W = f(U)) requires O(k) steps, so K = O(log2(k)) such verifications can
be done at the cost of one interpolation.
We assume now with Clancy et. al., that there is a degree k − 1 < D < t which
is minimal with the property that among all polynomials g(X) ∈ Fq[X ] of degree
k − 1 which interpolate vault points, f(X) is the only one which interpolates with
probability close to 1 at least D points. This yields a criterium for identifying f(X)
[CKL]:
Lemma 2. The complexity of the brute force attack problem using a suitable value
D as above is Cbf =
(
r
D
)
/
(
t
D
)
.
We suggest the following brute force attack, which is not dependent on the value
of D and is stronger then the previous:
Lemma 3. Let V(k, t, r,Fq) be a fuzzy fingerprint vault and k < t be chosen as
above. Then an intruder having intercepted V can recover the secret S in R =
C · (r/t)k operations, where C < 8rk.
Proof. We have shown that in less then < 1.1 · (r/t)k trials, Victor can find a set
of k points from the locking set L. In order to find such a set and then S, for each
k - tuple T = (Xi, Yi)
k
i=1 ⊂ V Victor has to
1. Compute the interpolating polynomial gT (X). It is proved in [GG] that
the implicit constant for Lagrange interpolation is 6.5; let K = 6.5 · log2(k).
Thus computing all the interpolation polynomials requires < 7.2 ·k log2(k) ·
(r/t)k operations.
2. Search a point
(U,W ) ∈ V \ T such that g(U) =W.(2)
This requires the equivalent of r/K Lagrange interpolations. If no point is
found, then discard T .
3. If T was not discarded, search for a further point which verifies (2). This
step is met with probability 1/q. If a point is found, add it to T ; otherwise
discard T .
4. Proceed until a break condition is encountered (no more points on the graph
of g(X)) or D points have been found in T , and thus g(X) = f(X) with
high probability.
Adding up the numbers of operations required by the steps 1.-4., with weights given
by the probabilities of occurrence, one finds:
R < 7.2 · (r/t)k ·k ·K · r ·
∞∑
j=0
(1/q)j = 7.2 · (r/t)k ·k ·K
rq
K(q − 1)
< 8.0 · (rk) · (r/t)k,
as claimed. 
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Here are some remarks on factors that influence the complexity of the brute force
attack:
(i) Restricting the region of interest from which Victor chooses points for his
unlocking set is irrelevant, if minutiae are assumed to be uniformly dis-
tributed over the template. In this case, r and t are scaled by the same
factor and thus r/t and the complexity of brute force remains unchanged.
(ii) The complexity grows when increasing the degree k of the polynomial f(X).
However, high degrees k require large unlocking sets, which may is a prob-
lem for average quality fingerprints and scanners. Thus one can only aug-
ment the degree to an extent which depends on the quality of both scanner
and fingerprint. The issue of adapting to these factors is addressed in [YV].
(iii) The complexity grows when increasing the number of chaff points. There is
a bound to this number, given by the size of the image on the one side and
the variance in the minutiae location between various data capturings and
extractions [CKL], on the other. Clancy and his coauthors find empirically
the lower bound d ≥ 10 for the distance between chaff points, and this
distance was essentially respected also by the subsequent works.
(iv) The complexity grows when reducing the size t of the genuine list. This is
however also detrimental for unlocking, since it may reduce the size of the
unlocking set below the required minimum.
What can be inferred about the security of fingerprint vaults from the seminal
paper [JS]? First, one observes that Juels and Sudan suggest the use of error
correcting codes, thus avoiding to transmit in the vault explicite indications to
whether an interpolation polynomial is the correct f(X). Uludag and Jain suggest
on the other hand in [UJ2] the use of CRC codes: thus S is padded by a CRC
code, adding 1 to the minimal degree k′ needed to encode S. Upon decoding, Bob
can check the CRC and ascertain that he found the correct secret. This simplifies
the unlocking procedure, but also allows the attacker to verify if he has found a
correct unlocking set. Does this bring advantages to Victor? The odds to find a
correct CRC are equal to the probability that k + 1 points are interpolated by the
same polynomial of degree k− 1. Thus, if the degree k > k′, Victor has no gain, as
follows form the Lemma 3.
It is shown in the Chapters 4 and 5 of [JS] that the amount of chaff points
is essential for security. The suggested minimum lays at about r ∼ 104. For
fingerprints, a large amount of chaff points naturally decreases the average distance
between these points in the list. The value r = 104 leads to an average distance
of 2 − 5 pixels between the point coordinates, depending on the resolution of the
original image. This is below realistic limits as mentioned in (iii) above. At this
distance, even in presence of a perfect alignment, the genuine verifier Bob should
need some additional information - like CRC or other - providing the confirmation
of the correct secret. But such a confirmation is contrary to the security lines on
base of which Juels and Sudan make there evaluation.
There is an apparent conflict between the general security proofs in [JS] and real-
istic applications of the fuzzy vault to fingerprints. In the implementation chapter,
the authors explicitely warn that applications involving privacy-protected matching
cannot achieve sufficient security. It is conceivable that fingerprint matching would
be considered by the authors as belonging to this category.
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3. Implementations of the fingerprint vault
We start with the most in depth analysis of security parameters for the fingerprint
vault, which was done by Clancy and coauthors in [CKL]. The paper focuses on
applications to key release on smart cards. They suggest using multiple scans in
order to obtain, by correlation, more reliable locking sets. As mentioned above, the
variance of minutiae locations which they observed in the process leads to defining
a minimum distance between chaff (and genuine) points, which is necessary for
correct unlocking. This minimal distance d ∼ 11 implies an upper bound for the
size r of the vault and thus the number of chaff points!
The authors use very interesting arguments on packing densities and argue that
in order to preserve the randomness of chaff points, these cannot have maximal
packing density. On the other hand, assuming that the intruder has access to a
sequence of vaults associated to the same fingerprint and he can align the data of
these vaults, the randomness of chaff points allows a correlation attack for finding
the genuine minutiae.
This observation suggests rather using perfectly regular high density chaff point
packing. These are hexagonal grids with mutual distance d between the points.
The genuine minutiae can be rounded to grid points, and Victor will have no clue
for distinguishing these from the chaff points. We shall comment below on this
topic.
The implementation documented in this paper suggests the following parameters
for optimal security: k = 14, D = 17, t = 38, r = 313. The brute force attack in
Lemma 3 is more efficient then the one of Theorem 1 of [CKL], on which they base
their security estimates. Using the above parameters and Lemma 3, we find an
attack complexity of ∼ 250. Comparing this to the complexity of genuine unlocking
yields a security factor F ∼ 244, which is below cryptographic security, unlike the
269 deduced by Clancy et. al. in [CKL]. Since the empirical values of t in [CKL]
range in the interval [20, 60] with expected value t = 38, it is possible that their
estimate was gained by using the minimal value of t which corresponds to maximal
security. However, this leads to a small difference between t and k and this may
reduce the rate of correct decodings.
By the balanced arguments used in the parameter choice, the security bounds
obtained on base of [CKL] are an indication of the vulnerability of the fingerprint
vault in general.
Yang and Verbauwhede describe in [YV] an implementation of the vault, in which
the degree of the polynomials f(X) varies in dependence of the size t of the genuine
list, which itself depends directly on template quality. From the point of view of
security, the paper can be considered as a follow up of [CKL], which addresses the
problem of poor image quality with its consequences for the size of the locking set.
The size of the secret S and polynomial degrees are adapted to the size of locking
sets. The proposal is consistent, its vulnerability to attacks is comparable to [CKL]
in general, and higher, when adapting to poor image quality.
The major contributions of Uludag and Jain in [UJ2] is to provide a useful set
of helper data for easing image alignment. This has an important impact on the
identification rate. As mentioned above, they bring the elegant and simple proposal
of adding a CRC to the secret, thus easing the unlocking work. We discussed above
the issue of the security risk increasment: this is arguably small. On the other
hand, the degree of k = 8 for the polynomial f(X) and vault size r = 200, whilst
t = 25, makes their system more vulnerable, with an absolute attack complexity of
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∼ 236. Better security can be achieved in this system by using the parameters of
[CKL].
4. Security discussion
We discuss in this section several variants for improving security of the fingerprint
vault. Future research shall analyze the practicality of some of them.
4.1. Using more fingers. We have shown that the parameters r, t, k, allowing
to control the security factor, are naturally bounded by image size, variance of
minutiae location and average number of reliable minutiae. They cannot thus be
modified beyond certain bounds and it is likely that this bounds have been well
established in [CKL]. It lays thus at hand to propose using for instance the imprints
of two fingers rather then only one, for creating the vault. This leads practically to
a squaring of the security factor.
4.2. Non - random chaff points. As mentioned above, it is suggested in [CKL]
that chaff points should have random distribution; this leads to halving the packing
density compared to maximal density packing. However, one can embrace the
opposite attitude. This consists in laying a hexagonal grid of size d = 11, proposed
by the authors upon the fingerprint template, thus achieving maximal packing.
Each grid point will be attached to some vault point - chaff or genuine. Thus Victor
will have no means for distinguishing between chaff points and genuine ones, despite
of the regularity of the grid.
Thanks to the error correcting codes, the genuine points can always be displaced
by a distance at most d/2 to a grid point. This strategy improves the security of the
vault in two ways: by doubling the size r of the vault and by avoiding correlation
attacks. The consequences need still be analyzed.
4.3. Quizzes using additional minutiae information. There is more informa-
tion in a minutia than its mere coordinates. Such are for instance its orientation,
the lengths and curvatures of incoming lines, neighboring data, etc. We propose to
attach to each minutia a quiz which can be solved in robust manner by Bob, but
which introduces for Victor several (say b) bits of uncertainty per minutia. Thus
for polynomial degree k, the security may be increased by a factor of 2kb.
Here is a simple example of how a quiz functions for the case of the orientation
of minutiae. Let X be the concatenated coordinates of a fixed minutia and let α be
its orientation, in a granularity of π/n, for some small integer n. Then, along with
(X, f(X)), the vault will also contain a value β = α + jπ/n: thus the minutia is
represented by (X,Y, β). Upon reception, Bob computes the integer 0 ≤ j < n such
that jπ = nα−nβ mod π. The value of j will then encode a certain transformation
Y ′ = T (Y ) of the received value Y and the interpolating value will be set to be
Y ′ = f(X). Note that the vault creator has control on the generation of β and it
may be chosen such that j can be safely recovered by the genuine user. For chaff
points, β is random. Several robust additional informations may as well increase
the security of the fingerprint vault to a cryptographically acceptable level.
4.4. The alternative of cryptographic security. These observations lead to
the question: is the use of one - way functions and template hiding an intrinsic
security constraint, or just one in many conceivable approaches to securing biomet-
ric authentication? The second is the case, and it is perfectly feasible to construct
a secure biometric authentication system based on the mechanisms used by state
of the art certification authorities. The mechanisms are standard and have been
8 PREDA MIHA˘ILESCU
implemented by some providers. An important advantage of public key cryptogra-
phy is that it allows attaching time stamps to transmitted finger templates, thus
reducing the consequences in the event that a template is compromised.
5. Conclusions
It has been attempted to achieve security in biometric applications either by
using one-way functions adapted to the specificities of biometric data, or by direct
application of strong cryptographic techniques. We showed that one of the leading
methods of the first category, the fuzzy vault, allows a simple attack to its instanti-
ation for fingerprint data [CKL, UJ1, UJ2, YV]. We have brought some suggestions
which may help raising the security level of the fingerprint vault to cryptographic
acceptable values.
One may argue that similar attacks could be possible to other related methods
and thus cryptographic security is preferable, whenever it can be achieved or af-
forded. Subsequent work should consider variants of the one - way function ideas
which could meet the standards of cryptographic security. More in depth statisti-
cal studies concerning the amount of information available from various fingerprint
related data are called for, thus providing a solid foundation for security claims.
Also, cryptographic security can be brought in a wide scale of variants; analyzing
pros and contras of such variants is an open topic.
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